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DICTUM ON DICTA:  
OBITER DICTA IN WTO DISPUTES 
HENRY GAO 
(forthcoming in World Trade Review) 
Abstract:  
This paper discusses an important legal issue raised by the United States in its recent 
attempt to block the reappointment of an Appellate Body member. According to the US, in some 
of his decisions, the member has made overreaching findings that amount to obiter dicta. As 
obiter dictum is a unique concept in the Common Law system, the US argument may only stand if 
the concept may be found in the WTO legal system as well. With a careful analysis of the concept 
of dicta in Common Law and a close examination of the effects of past panel and Appellate Body 
decisions in WTO dispute settlement, the paper rejects the US argument by refuting each of the 
three premises of the US argument, i.e., the WTO legal system based on Common Law; WTO 
follows stare decisis; and the WTO has rules against dicta. In addition to original contributions 
on the nature of the WTO dispute settlement system in theory, the article also provides some 
practical advice on how the controversy may be resolved.   
 
Watch your thoughts, for they become words. 
Watch your words, for they become actions. 
Watch your actions, for they become habits. 
Watch your habits, for they become your character. 
And watch your character, for it becomes your destiny. 
What we think, we become. 
 
- as per Margaret Thatcher in the movie “The Iron Lady”  
 
                         
 Email: gaohenry@gmail.com. 
The author wishes to thank Professors William Davey, Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Giorgio Sacerdoti, Mitsuo 
Matsushita, Peter Van den Bossche, Seung Wha Chang, Yasuhei Taniguchi, Debra Steger, Raj Bhala, Alan Winters, 
and the two anonymous reviewers for their most helpful comments. All errors remain the author’s own. All websites 
cited are current as of 5 March 2018. 
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The establishment of the Appellate Body in the World Trade Organisation (“WTO”) is 
widely regarded as “[o]ne of the most important innovations of the WTO dispute settlement 
system”1 that is “almost revolutionary”.2 It is innovative in two ways. First is the addition of an 
appellate phase, which is “rather creative, given that such a stage is not commonplace in State-
to-State dispute settlement mechanisms”.3 The second innovation is that it is a standing body, 
unlike the ad hoc dispute settlement panels under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(“GATT”) and even the WTO. As noted by Lacarte, this is “one of the most marked departures 
from previous GATT practice”.4  
 
As a new institution, however, the Appellate Body could not benefit from the respect 
accorded to long-established institutions, and must instead “earn” its reputation by “everything 
that the Appellate Body said and did”.5 While it has “earned” its reputation “quickly in a short 
span of time”6, it is not free of controversy. As the result, the Appellate Body has been subject to 
many criticisms over the years. Some of these are minor technical issues such as the tone of the 
Appellate Body in its reports “that was widely perceived as excessively critical, if not derisive, 
of panel reports”.7 Others are more controversial issues such as opening the hearing to the 
public8 and the acceptance of amicus curiae briefs.9 However, nothing in the history of the 
Appellate Body has been more serious than the current re-appointment debate, which has been 
widely regarded as “legitimacy crisis” in the WTO.10   
                         
1 V. Hughes, ‘The WTO Dispute Settlement System: A Success Story’, in Julio Lacarte and Jaime Granados (eds), 
Inter-Governmental Trade Dispute Settlement: Multilateral and Regional Approaches, London: Cameron May 
(2004), at 121. 
2 J. Lacarte-Muró, ‘Launching the Appellate Body’, in G. Marceau (ed), A History of Law and Lawyers in the 
GATT/WTO: The Development of the Rule of Law in the Multilateral Trading System, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press (2017), at 477.  
3 Hughes, supra note 1, at 121.  
4 J. Lacarte and F. Pierola, 'Comparing the WTO and GATT Dispute Settlement Mechanisms: What was 
accomplished in the Uruguay Round?', in Lacarte and Granados (eds), supra note 1, at 47.  
5 D. Steger, ‘The founding of the Appellate Body’, in G. Marceau (ed), supra note 2, at 451.  
6 A. Ganesan, ‘The Appellate Body in its formative years Body’, in G. Marceau (ed), supra note 2, at 544.  
7 W. Davey, ‘The first years of WTO dispute settlement Body’, in G. Marceau (ed), supra note 2, at 371.  
8 J. Bacchus, ‘Let the Sunshine in: One View of Dispute Settlement Understanding Review’ in Lacarte and 
Granados (eds), supra note 1, at 141-150.  
9 Hughes, supra note 1, at 117-121. See also the discussion of these issues by D. Unterhalter, ‘The authority of an 
Institution: the Appellate Body under Review’, in G. Marceau (ed), supra note 2, at 471.  
10 See e.g., G. Shaffer, ‘Will the US Undermine the World Trade Organization?’, in Huffington Post, available at 
https://www.huffingtonpost.com/gregory-shaffer/will-the-us-undermine-the_b_10108970.html (last visited 21 
October 2017). A. Sarvarian & F. Fontanelli, ‘The USA and Re-Appointment at the WTO: A ‘Legitimacy Crisis’?’, 
in European Journal of International Law: Talk!, 27 May 2016, available at https://www.ejiltalk.org/the-usa-and-re-
appointment-at-the-wto-a-legitimacy-crisis/ (last visited 21 October 2017). 
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Most of the discussions so far have only focused on whether the US has the right to block 
Appellate Body re-appointments, or if Appellate Body members may be chastised for their 
statements in Appellate Body reports. This article approaches the debate over the US blockage 
from a fresh perspective by arguing that the US allegation of obiter dicta is invalid as there is no 
basis for such claim in the WTO. Through these discussions, the paper provides important 
insights into the nature of the WTO dispute settlement system, the effects of panel and Appellate 
Body reports, and their respective functions in WTO dispute settlement.  
 
1. The Appellate Body Reappointment Saga  
 
On 11 May 2016, the United States (“the US”) shocked the world by announcing that 
they will block the reappointment of Appellate Body member Prof. Seung Wha Chang. In a joint 
statement issued by Deputy US Trade Representative (“USTR”) Michael Punke and USTR 
General Counsel Tim Reif, the US declared that  
“The United States is strongly opposed to Appellate Body members deviating from their 
appropriate role by restricting the rights or expanding the obligations of WTO members under 
the WTO agreements… The United States will not support any individual with a record of 
restricting trade agreement rights or expanding trade agreement obligations.”  11  
 
At the DSB meeting held on May 23, the US further clarified their position by stating that 
“we do not consider that his service reflects the role assigned to the Appellate Body by WTO 
Members in the WTO agreements”.12 In particular, the US referred to four reports in which Prof. 
Chang allegedly “add[ed] to or diminish[ed] the rights and obligations provided in the covered 
agreements.”13 In three of the four reports, the US accused Prof. Chang of addressing issues 
                         
11 J. Caporal, ‘Debate Erupts over US Blocking Korean Appellate Body Reappointment’, in Inside U.S. Trade, 13 
May 2016. 
12 Mission of the United States, Geneva, Switzerland, Statement by the United States at the Meeting of the WTO 
Dispute Settlement Body, Geneva, May 23, 2016, at 11, available at https://geneva.usmission.gov/wp-
content/uploads/2016/05/May23.DSB_.pdf (last visited 21 October 2017).  
13 Ibid., at 12-13. These four reports are Appellate Body Report, Argentina – Measures Relating to Trade in Goods 
and Services, WT/DS453/AB/R and Add.1, adopted 9 May 2016; Appellate Body Report, India – Measures 
Concerning the Importation of Certain Agricultural Products, WT/DS430/AB/R, adopted 19 June 2015; Appellate 
Body Report, United States – Countervailing Duty Measures on Certain Products from China, WT/DS437/AB/R, 
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which were moot (Argentina – Financial Services), not appealed (India – Agricultural Products), 
or not raised by parties (US – Countervailing Measures (China)).14 According to the US, these 
amounted to obiter dicta as they are not related to “issues necessary to resolve the dispute”.15 As 
to the fourth report (US – Countervailing and Anti-Dumping Measures (China)), the US claimed 
that the Appellate Body has adopted “a very problematic and erroneous approach to reviewing a 
Member’s domestic law” by “substitut[ing] the judgment of WTO adjudicators for that of a 
Member’s domestic legal system as to what is lawful under that Member’s domestic law”.16 
 
The US blockage led to widespread criticisms from the WTO membership.17 Prof. 
Chang’s home country South Korea, in particular, claimed that the US opposition “would 
seriously undermine the independence and integrity of the Appellate Body”18 and reportedly 
declared its opposition to the reappointment of any Appellate Body members.19 At the DSB 
meetings where the issue was discussed, the US position received no support from other WTO 
Members, which called the US blockage “extraordinary, exceptional”20 and “unprecedented”.21 
At the dedicated DSB session on the issue on 26 October, Korea, supported by Brazil, India, and 
Mexico, tried to solve the problem by tabling a non-paper that proposed to limit future 
appointments to the Appellate Body to a single term.22 As not all Members supported the 
proposal, however, it was not adopted.23 
                                                                               
adopted 16 January 2015; and Appellate Body Report, United States – Countervailing and Anti-Dumping Measures 
on Certain Products from China, WT/DS449/AB/R and Corr.1, adopted 22 July 2014, DSR 2014:VIII, p. 3027.  
14 Ibid., at 13-15. 
15 Ibid., at 15. 
16 Ibid. 
17 See World Trade Organisation, WTO members debate appointment/reappointment of Appellate Body members, 23 
May 2016, available at https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news16_e/dsb_23may16_e.htm (last visited 21 October 
2017). See also K. Raja, ‘Isolated US, still vetoes Chang reappointment to AB’, in South North Development 
Monitor, #8246, 24 May 2016, available at http://www.twn.my/title2/twe/2016/616-617/8.htm (last visited 21 
October 2017) and Inside US Trade, U.S. Slammed at DSB for Blocking Korean Appellate Body Reappointment, 27 
May 2016.  
18 K. Raja, ‘US stands alone in vetoing reappointment of Chang to AB’, in South North Development Monitor, 
#8247, 25 May 2016, available at http://www.twn.my/title2/wto.info/2016/ti160520.htm (last visited 21 October 
2017).  
19 Sarvarian & Fontanelli, supra note 10.   
20 B. Baschuk, ‘U.S. Blocks Korean Judge From WTO Appellate Body’, in International Trade Daily, 24 May 2016, 
available at https://www.bna.com/us-blocks-korean-n57982072872/ (last visited 21 October 2017). 
21 S. Donnan, ‘US accused of undermining WTO’, in Financial Times, 30 May 2016, available at 
https://www.ft.com/content/1b89a3b4-261d-11e6-8ba3-cdd781d02d89?mhq5j=e5 (last visited 21 October 2017). 
22 K. Raja, ‘DSB holds second dedicated session on AB reappointment process’, in South North Development 
Monitor, #8343, 28 October 2016; WTO Dispute Settlement Body, Minutes OF Meeting held in the Centre William 
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There were also strong reactions from both current and former Appellate Body members. 
On May 18, 2016, the six remaining Appellate Body members sent a letter to DSB Chairman 
Ambassador Xavier Carim. In the letter, they stressed that the Appellate Body reports are reports 
of the Appellate Body as a whole and “no case is the result of a decision by one Appellate Body 
Member, nor should interpretations or outcomes be attributed to a single Member”.24 Moreover, 
they argued that “the tying of an Appellate Body Member’s reappointment to interpretations in 
specific cases” could undermine the trust of WTO Members “in the independence and 
impartiality of Appellate Body Members”.25  
 
On May 31, 2016, the 13 living former Appellate Body members also wrote another open 
letter to Carim, in which they warned that the US action would not only undermine the 
“impartiality and independence of the … Appellate Body”, but “put the very future of the entire 
WTO trading system at risk”.26 In particular, they pointed out that the US approach is flawed, as 
“[a] decision on the reappointment of a Member of the Appellate Body should not be made on 
the basis of the decisions in which that Member has participated as a part of the divisions in 
particular appeals… Nor should either appointment or reappointment to the Appellate Body be 
determined on the basis of doctrinal preference”.27  
 
They proposed two solutions instead. First, to the extent that “WTO Members ever 
conclude that the Appellate Body has erred when clarifying a WTO obligation in WTO dispute 
settlement”, they should try to adopt a legal interpretation according to Article IX:2 of the 
Marrakesh Agreement.28 Second, the Members can also abolish the current system of one four-
                                                                               
Rappard on 26 October 2016, WT/DSB/M/387, 5 December 2016. See also Jack Caporal, DSB Kicks Off 
Discussions of Appellate Body Reappointment Process, in Inside U.S. Trade, 30 Sep 2016. 
23 Raja, supra note 22.  
24 Thomas R. Graham, Ujal Singh Bhatia, Ricardo Ramírez-Hernández, Shree Baboo Chekitan Servansing, Peter 
Van den Bossche, Yuejiao Zhang, Letter to H.E. Mr Xavier Carim, Chair, Dispute Settlement Body, World Trade 
Organization, Geneva, 18 May 2016, at 1.  
25 Ibid. 
26 Georges Abi-Saab, James Bacchus, Luiz Olavo Baptista, Lilia R. Bautista, Claus-Dieter Ehlermann, AV Ganesan, 
Jennifer Hillman, Merit E. Janow, Mitsuo Matsushita, Shotaro Oshima, Giorgio Sacerdoti, Yasuhei Taniguchi, 
David Unterhalter, letter to Ambassador Xavier Carim of South Africa, Chairman, Dispute Settlement Body, World 
Trade Organization, Geneva, Switzerland, 31 May 2016, at 2.   
27 Ibid. 
28 Ibid. 
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year term with the possibility of a second four-year term and replace it with “a single, longer 
term for all Members of the Appellate Body”.29 
The reappointment saga also generated considerable interest in academic circles, with 
most scholars condemning the US action and expressing their support to Prof. Chang.30 Most of 
the discussions so far revolved around the following issues: whether it is appropriate to attribute 
the views in an Appellate Body report to one division member only; whether a WTO Member 
has the right to block the reappointment of an Appellate Body member; should the decision to 
reappoint an Appellate Body member be influenced by his position on certain WTO law issues 
or preference for certain judicial style? There are sharply divided views on all of these issues, 
with the US government saying yes to all, while other WTO Members, former and current 
Appellate Body members, and the academia mostly saying no. 
 
Curiously, however, one key issue seems to be ignored in the debate. Everyone, no matter 
where he/she stands in this debate, seems to accept the US accusations that Prof. Chang’s views 
in these decisions amount to obiter dicta, or at least it is possible to have obiter dicta in WTO 
panel and Appellate Body reports. As I will demonstrate in this article, the entire theory of obiter 
dictum in WTO dispute settlement reports is flawed as none of its three underlying premises are 
valid. Thus, in the end, the whole US theory of the possibility of an Appellate Body member 
violating its role by giving obiter dicta in Appellate Body reports is but a dictum on dicta.  
 
                         
29 Ibid., at 3.  
30 See Shaffer, supra note 10; M. Elsig, M. Pollack and G. Shaffer, ‘The U.S. is causing a major controversy in the 
World Trade Organization. Here’s what’s happening’, in Washington Post: Monkey Cage, June 6, 2016, available at 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/06/06/the-u-s-is-trying-to-block-the-reappointment-
of-a-wto-judge-here-are-3-things-to-know/?utm_term=.3917ba85d3cf(last visited 21 October 2017); G. Sacerdoti, et 
al, ‘The WTO in 2016: Systemic Developments at the WTO and at the Dispute Settlement System and Review of 
the Appellate Body's Reports’, Bocconi Legal Studies Research Paper, March 1, 2017. Available at SSRN: 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2940107 (last visited 21 October 2017); K. Daugirdas and J. D. Mortenson, Contemporary 
Practice of the United States Relating to International Law: United States Blocks Reappointment of WTO Appellate 
Body Member, 110 American Journal of International Law 3 (2016), at 573-579; Sarvarian & Fontanelli, supra note 
10. See also the following comments on the International Economic Law and Policy Blog, including S. Charnovitz, 
The Obama Administration's Attack on Appellate Body Independence Shows The Need for Reforms, 22 September 
2016, available at  http://worldtradelaw.typepad.com/ielpblog/2016/09/the-obama-administrations-attack-on-
appellate-body-independence-shows-the-need-for-reforms-.html; S. Lester, The U.S. Justification for its Appellate 
Body Reappointment Actions, 27 May 2016, available at http://worldtradelaw.typepad.com/ielpblog/2016/05/the-us-
justification-for-its-appellate-body-actions.html ; H. Gao, Why Prof. Chang?, 27 May 2016, 
http://worldtradelaw.typepad.com/ielpblog/2016/05/why-prof-chang.html; H. Gao, Why Prof. Chang II: A Few 
More Pieces of the Puzzle, 27 May 2016, available at http://worldtradelaw.typepad.com/ielpblog/2016/05/why-prof-
chang-ii-a-few-more-pieces-of-the-puzzle.html(last visited 21 October 2017).  
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2. The Concept of Obiter Dictum 
 
To understand the US position, we first need to understand what is “dictum (plural 
dicta)”. Traditionally, a dictum is defined as “an expression of opinion in regard to some point or 
rule of law, made by a judge in the course of a judicial opinion, but not necessary to the 
determination of the case before the court.” 31 Over the years, alternative definitions have been 
suggested. These include, for example, “a legal conclusion stated in the opinion but not 
applicable to the particular facts of the case”, or “overgeneralization in light of the particular 
facts [of the case]”.32 However, neither of these two variations add anything new. If a legal 
conclusion is divorced from the facts of the case, then it is not necessary to the decision of the 
case. Similarly, overgeneralizations would also not be necessary for the decision. Thus, both of 
them can be submerged into the traditional definition.  
 
A. Categories of Dicta   
 
Depending on the manner that the statement in question is pronounced, dictum can be 
divided into several categories such as obiter dictum, judicial dictum, gratis dictum, dictum 
proprium, and simplex dictum.33 Many of the distinctions are now obsolete, and the most widely 
recognized distinctions are between the first two.34 The key here is whether the statement in 
question is fully argued by the parties and deliberated upon by the court. Thus, if a point is 
neither argued by the parties nor fully deliberated by the court, it is regarded as obiter dictum.35 
In contrast, judicial dicta “are the product of a more comprehensive discussion of legal issues, 
and usually involve points briefed and argued by the parties”,36 but they are “not essential to the 
decision”.37 As judicial dicta is a more thoughtful opinion than obiter dicta, it is often accorded 
more persuasive authority, but it is still non-binding.38 Nowadays, however, even this distinction 
                         
31 H. C. Black, Handbook on the Law of Judicial Precedents, or, The Science of Case Law (1912) at 166.  
32 ‘Dictum Revisited’, 4 Stanford Law Review (1952) at 509.  
33 Black’s Law Dictionary, entry on Dictum.  
34 See e.g., Dictum Revisited, supra note 32, at 513; M. McAllister, ‘Dicta Redefined’, 47 Willamette Law Review 
(2011), at 167.  
35 McAllister, ibid., at 167. 
36 Ibid.  
37 Black’s Law Dictionary, entry on Dictum.  
38 McAllister, supra note 34, at 168.  
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is losing its significance, as many courts in major Common Law jurisdictions such as the US no 
longer follow the traditional distinction.39 
 
B. The Effects of Dicta  
 
The traditional view is that, unlike the holding or the ratio decidendi of the court, a 
dictum is not binding.40 As explained by Black, because dicta “are not the judicial determinations 
of the court, they are never entitled to the force and effect of precedents, in the same or other 
courts, and do not preclude the rendering of a subsequent contrary decision”.41 However, this 
does not mean that a dictum has no effect at all. As observed by Black, dicta “though not 
precedents, may possess considerable value as persuasive arguments”.42 Thus, lower courts in 
particular shall treat a dictum “with respectful consideration, not only because it proceeds from 
the appellate court, but also as furnishing a suggestion of the decision which that court might be 
expected to make if the point should come fairly before it for determination”.43 In particular, 
“long repetition of a dictum… may clothe it with the weight of a precedent”.44 This is especially 
the case for the dicta of the Supreme Court, which has been regarded by lower courts as “very 
persuasive” and followed “slavishly”.45  
 
As we can see from the discussions above, while in theory a dictum is supposed to have 
no effect upon the development of the jurisprudence, the ultimate fate of a dictum depends upon 
the treatment, or the “attitudes” of subsequent courts.46 In many cases, various dicta have been 
picked up by later courts and elevated to “a position hardly distinguishable from that of a direct 
adjudication”.47 Thus, some scholars have cast doubts on the utility of the formalistic 
categorization between holdings and dicta.48 Instead, they suggested that the effect of dicta 
                         
39 Scofield, Robert G. Scofield, The Distinction Between Judicial Dicta and Obiter Dicta, 25 Los Angeles Lawyer, 
17 (Oct. 2002), at 33, as cited in McAllister, ibid. 
40 Black, supra note 31, at 176.  
41 Ibid. 
42 Ibid, at p. 179.  
43 Ibid. 
44 ‘Dictum Revisited’, supra note 32, at 513. 
45 Ibid. 
46 Ibid., at p. 515.  
47 Black, supra note 31, at 179.  
48 McAllister, supra note 34, at 162.  
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should be approached with a more pragmatic method. The best attempt is the functional 
approach by McAllister, which divides dicta into three categories: vibrant dicta, where “the 
otherwise non-binding judicial pronouncement promptly flowers into law…either by the court 
that issues the dicta, or by the accumulation of rulings from other courts”;49 “dead dicta”, i.e., 
dicta that die either “through the issuing court's explicit pronouncements” or “implicitly through 
a series of unfavourable rulings”;50 and “divergent dicta”, which, as its name suggests, receives 
divergent treatments from subsequent courts due to their disagreements over its persuasiveness 
and effect.51    
 
C. Why the Concept?  
 
The concept of dicta, along with the distinction with holdings, is unique and “essential”52 
to the Common Law system. According to the doctrine of stare decisis53 or precedents, later 
courts are supposed to follow the holdings by earlier courts.54 Without the concept of dicta, 
everything stated by the earlier courts would be binding on the later courts. This might not be a 
problem if the court always restricts itself to what is absolutely necessary for the resolution of the 
case at hand, but this is rarely the case. Instead, as has been observed by Llewellyn and Aldisert, 
judges tend to “over-state” their case “in the heat of the argument” and “overwrite opinions”,55 
with the result that “discussion outran the decision”.56 Or worse still, judges may deliberately 
“plant” dicta to steer the development of the law and “preempt colleagues who might later 
decide a further issue in a manner not to our liking”.57 These concerns make it necessary to draw 
the distinction.  
 
                         
49 Ibid., at 163.  
50 Ibid., at 164.  
51 Ibid., at 164-165.  
52 Posner, supra note 64, at 192-193. 
53 According to Black’s Law Dictionary, stare decisis means "to stand by things decided". However, there has been 
considerable confusion in determining what "things" have in fact been "decided". See e.g. , A. N. Steinman, ‘To Say 
What the Law Is: Rules, Results, and the Dangers of Inferential Stare decisis’, 99 Virginia Law Review (2013);, at 
1810; M. Abramowicz & M. Stearns, ‘Defining Dicta’, 57 Stanford Law Review (2005), at 1094.   
54 McAllister, supra note 34, at 161; ‘Dictum Revisited’, supra note 32, at 513; K. Greenawalt, ‘Reflections on 
Holding and Dictum’, 39 Journal of Legal Education (1989), at 431.  
55 K. N. Llewellyn, The Bramble Bush: On Our Law and Its Study (1996), at 43-44.  
56 Aldisert et al., Opinion Writing and Opinion Leaders, 31 Cardozo Law Review (2009) 1, at 19.  
57 McAllister, supra note 34, at 177.  
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How to draw the distinction then? There are two possible approaches. The first approach 
is looking at the substantive merits of the respective statements. The most trustworthy statements 
are those made by the courts when “they are aware of the relevant facts, and the possible 
competing legal positions have been argued at length by lawyers”.58 In contrast, the courts’ 
“passing comments on peripherally related legal subjects” are much less reliable as they “are 
expressions of opinions … which may not have been argued at the bar or duly brought to the 
attention of the court, or that they do not embody the mature and deliberate opinion of the 
judges”.59 While this approach provides a satisfactory solution to most cases, it would not be 
able to distinguish judicial dictum from holding as the former also benefits from arguments in 
court and the full consideration of the court. This is why we need a second approach that also 
takes into account the raison d'être for the judicial law-making power. The core function of the 
court is to resolve disputes, thus the law-making power is only a by-product of such function. 
Therefore, “the authority of a particular court should extend only to what is needed to resolve the 
dispute”, lest the court, as the “occasional legislators”,60 usurp the legislative function of the 
“fulltime” legislature, which is the legislative branch proper.61 This means that the law-making 
power only extends to those statements necessary to resolve the dispute at hand, but not the 
unnecessary sound-bites.   
 
3. Obiter Dictum in WTO Law? 
 
As discussed above, dictum is a concept unique to Common Law. Thus, the argument 
that the concept also exists in WTO law presumes that the WTO law system is modelled after the 
Common Law system. Or, short of that, that there is a system of precedents in WTO law. Or 
alternatively, that the WTO has rules against dictum. However, as I will elaborate below, none of 
these three assumptions is valid.  
 
A. WTO Follows Common Law  
 
                         
58 Greenawalt, supra note 54, at 434. 
59 McAllister, supra note 34, at 172.  
60 R. Posner, How Judges Think (2008), at 81.  
61 Greenawalt, supra note 54, at 434. 
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As I have demonstrated in the last part, the concept of dicta is used to distinguish the 
unnecessary parts of a decision from the key holding, or the ratio decidendi of the case. Ratio, in 
turn, forms the main body of precedents, or judge-made law, which is the hallmark of the 
Common Law system.  
 
In contrast, neither judicial precedent or judicial law-making is recognized under the 
Civil Law system. In France, for examples, “[t]he central conviction… is that judges cannot be 
lawmakers”,62 Instead, “[l]aw-making … was entirely reserved for the legislature.”63. As pointed 
out by many comparative law scholars, such aversion to judicial law-making is a legacy of the 
French revolution, which viewed the judiciary as an enemy due to their excessive power under 
the ancien regime and sought to reign in the courts with the monopoly of legislative power by 
the legislature.64 Such deep distrust of the judiciary even leads to explicit codifications of the 
prohibition on judicial law-making. The most well-known examples are “[t]he courts may not 
directly or indirectly take any part in the exercise of the legislative power” under Article 10 of 
the Code de l'organisation judiciare (Code of Judicial Organization)65 and “[i]t is forbidden for 
judges to make pronouncements by means of general and regulatory provisions on the cases 
submitted to them” under Articles 5 of the Code Civil.66 While there have been references to the 
jurisprudence or the jurisprudence constante of the Cour de cassation (Court of Cassation), the 
fact remains that “the Cour de cassation’s jurisprudence is not officially binding on the lower 
Courts” and “French lower courts are always free to depart from the Cour de cassation’s 
jurisprudence”.67 Indeed, as noted by de S.-O.-I'E. Lasser, the French Cour de cassation is rather 
annoyed with the lower court’s  reference to its "so-called jurisprudence", and jurisprudence of 
the Cour can not be cited by lower courts as the legal basis for overturning a decision.68  
 
                         
62 J. P. Dawson, Oracles of the Law (1968) at 415.  
63 Ibid., at 392.  
64 Dawson, supra note 62, at 263; J. H. Merryman, The Civil Law Tradition (1969), at 37; R. J. Cummins, ‘The 
General Principles of Law, Separation of Powers and Theories of Judicial Decision in France’, 35 International & 
Comparative Law Quarterly (1986) at 599; M. de S.-O.-I'E. Laser, ‘Judicial (Self-Portraits: Judicial Discourse in the 
French Legal System’, 104 Yale Law Journal (1995), at 1330.  
65 Code de l'organisation Judiciare, tit. II, art. 10. Aug. 16-24. 1790, as cited in Lasser, ibid., at 1335.  
66 Ibid.  
67 J. Komárek, ‘Judicial Lawmaking and Precedent in Supreme Courts’, LSE Legal Studies Working Paper No. 
4/2011, at 21-27. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1793219.    
68 Lasser, supra note 64, at 1338-1339. 
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Similarly, in Germany, there has been a long tradition of following Justinian's maxim 
“non exemplis sed legibus iudicandum est” (decisions should be based on legislations, not on 
precedents).69 While there has been increasing reference to court decisions after the Second 
World War,70 there is still “no more inclination than before to urge a strict theory of precedent on 
German courts”.71 Indeed, attempts to make the decisions of the Constitutional Court binding 
were explicitly rejected by the Great Senate for Civil Matters, which noted that making the 
decisions of the court binding on all organs of the government “would be to elevate a court into a 
supreme law-making body not chosen by the people, to eliminate the safeguarding formalities 
essential to law-making in a Rechtstaat, to destroy the separation of governmental powers and 
the federal system, and to borrow from the Anglo-Saxon legal world conceptions of judicial 
power that are alien to Germany.”72 
 
As I will demonstrate in the next two sub-sections, the WTO rules do not recognize either 
a binding precedent system or judicial law-making power. This clearly rules out the possibility 
that the WTO is based on the Common Law model.73 Instead, if one has to choose one between 
the two systems, the Civil Law system has a much stronger claim for influencing the WTO legal 
system. There are three reasons for this: 
 
                         
69 Dawson, supra note 62, at 440. See also C. Allen, Law in the Making 172-73 (1966), as cited in W. T. Tete, Code, 
Custom and the Courts: Notes Toward a Louisiana Theory of Precedent, 48 Tulane Law Review 1, 24 (1973-1974), 
at footnote 30.  
70 Dawson, supra note 62, at 432-502.  
71 Ibid., at 499.  
72 13 Entscheidungen des Bundesgerichtshofs in Zivilsachen 265, 279-282, as cited in Dawson, supra note 62, at 
491.  
73 This article uses “Common Law” in its traditional sense, i.e., as a domestic legal system. This should not be 
confused with the emerging usage of Common Law in the context of international law, with two major schools of 
thoughts. The first, “International Common Law” as coined by Bhala, Guzman and Meyer, refers to the case law 
built on the decisions of international tribunals. In my view, as such “common laws” are not binding, they are better 
referred to as the “common jurisprudence” of international courts. See R. Bhala, ‘The Precedent Setters: De Facto 
Stare decisis in WTO Adjudication (Part Two of a Trilogy)’, 9 Journal of Transnational Law and Policy 1 (1999); 
A. T. Guzman & T. L. Meyer, ‘International Common Law: The Soft Law of International Tribunals’, 9 Chicago 
Journal of International Law 2 (2009), at 515-536. The second is the “Common Law of International Trade” as 
suggested by Weiler and Cottier, which refers to the common traits and overall coherence between the WTO and 
other regional and bilateral agreements. As they focus on the common rules of different trade agreements, I think 
they are better named as “common rules”. See J. H.H. Weiler, The EU, the WTO and the NAFTA: Towards a 
Common Law of International Trade (2000); Thomas Cottier, ‘The Common Law of International Trade and the 
Future of the World Trade Organization’, 18 Journal of International Economic Law 1 (2015), at 3-20. 
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First, the main source of law in Common Law is judicial decisions or judge-made law, 
while legislations reign supreme in Civil Law countries.74 Similarly, the paramount role of 
formal legislations in the WTO has been repeated ad nauseam. In the WTO parlance, these 
legislations are known as “covered agreements”, i.e., agreements listed in Appendix 1 of the 
Dispute Settlement Understanding (“DSU”).75 In the DSU, the phrase “covered agreement”, in 
either singular or plural forms, appeared 72 times in the main text and 7 times in the Appendixes 
and footnotes. The key provision is Art. 3.2, which emphasizes that the purpose of the dispute 
settlement system is “to preserve the rights and obligations of Members under the covered 
agreements”. It also warns that the DSB “cannot add to or diminish the rights and obligations 
provided in the covered agreements” in its recommendations and rulings, which is repeated 
verbatim in Art. 19.1. Similarly, according to Arts. 7.1 and 11, the function of the panel is 
confined to examine the consistency of the challenged trade measure with the relevant provisions 
in the “covered agreements”. Such slavish reliance on legislations can only be found in the Civil 
Law system.  
 
Second, as the legislature monopolizes the law-making power in Civil Law countries, the 
role of the judiciary is reduced to that of a technical76 or even grammatical77 interpreter within 
rigid parameters.78 This approach is grounded in the idea that the Codes provide a complete and 
perfect set of legal text that can encompass “all cases that life could possibly offer”79 and judges 
are “merely applying pre-existing rules – the rules laid down in the code”.80 Again, such an 
approach is adopted by the WTO legal system, which does not recognize any source of law other 
than the sacred “covered agreements”. The role of a WTO panel, according to Art. 11.1 of the 
DSU, is to make “an objective assessment of the facts of the case and the applicability of and 
conformity with the relevant covered agreements”. The wordings suggest that all that a WTO 
panel need to do is to mechanically apply the covered agreements and then determine the 
                         
74 See J. Dainow, ‘The Civil Law and the Common Law: Some Points of Comparison’, 15 American Journal of 
Comparative Law (1967), at 423-424. See also G. Sacerdoti, ‘Precedent in the Settlement of International Economic 
Disputes: The WTO and Investment Arbitration Models’, Bocconi Legal Studies Research Paper No. 1931560 
(2011). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1931560, at 4.  
75 See Art. 1.1 and Appendix 1 of the DSU. 
76 Dainow, supra note 74, at 421.  
77 Lasser, supra note 64, at 1327.  
78 Sacerdoti, supra note 74, at 4.  
79 C. de la V. Benayas, ‘Judicial Method of Interpretation of Codes’, 42 Louisiana Law Review (1982), at 1645.  
80 Posner, supra note 60, at 144.  
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conformity of the challenged measure accordingly. Indeed, it could even be argued that, strictly 
speaking, WTO panel and Appellate Body do not even have the power to “interpret” the covered 
agreements. Instead, according to Art. 3.2 of the DSU, they only have the power to “clarify the 
existing provisions of those agreements in accordance with customary rules of interpretation of 
public international law”. On the other hand, one could argue that such approach is naive and 
unworkable and may even point to the reference to “legal interpretations developed by the panel” 
under Art. 17.6 as an implicit acquiescence of the interpretive power of the panel. But any faith 
one might place on such implicit interpretive power must be severely shattered in the face of the 
explicit warning under Art. 3.9 that “[t]he provisions of [the DSU] are without prejudice to the 
rights of Members to seek authoritative interpretation of provisions of a covered agreement 
through decision-making under the WTO Agreement”. In other words, here the WTO legal 
system is again taking the traditional Civil Law approach. One could even say that it is much 
stricter than that of most modern Civil Law countries, and only falls an inch short of the explicit 
ban on the interpretive power of judges by the Roman emperor Iustinianus in his Codex.81 
 
Third, another key difference between Common and Civil law systems is whether the 
judicial decisions are made on a collective or individual basis. In Civil Law jurisdictions, 
“judicial decision is rendered by the entire court as a unit” with judges remain “anonymous”.82 
Individual opinions such as “[d]issenting and concurring opinions are forbidden”83 or at least 
discouraged.84 In contrast, a defining feature of Common Law courts decisions is the 
“personalisation” of views85, with each judge given the freedom to expound on his own point of 
view.86 Indeed, it could even be said that a Common Law judgment is “the sum of the decisions 
of the individual judges”.87 Again, between the two, the WTO legal system bears more 
resemblance to the Civil Law approach for the following reasons: 
 
                         
81 Sacerdoti, supra note 74, at footnote 11.  
82 Dainow, supra note 74, at 432, D. Terris, C. P.R. Romano, and L. Swigart, ‘International Judges and International 
Law’, in D. Terris, C. P.R. Romano, and L. Swigart (eds), The International Judge: An Introduction to the Men and 
Women Who Decide the World's Cases (2007), at 123.  
83 Lasser, supra note 64, at 1342.  
84 Sacerdoti, supra note 74, at 4. 
85 Ibid., 4 
86 Dainow, supra note 74, at 432. 
87 Terris et al (eds), supra note 82, at 123. 
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1. Under the DSU, strictly speaking, it is not the panel or the Appellate Body which 
decides individual disputes. Their role is limited to making recommendations to the 
DSB,88 which is the WTO Membership acting on a collective basis.89 As argued by 
Debra Steger, “[t]he Appellate Body only has jurisdiction for a particular appeal 
once a notice of appeal has been submitted to the DSB, and that jurisdiction is lost 
once its report has been circulated and adopted by the DSB. It does not have any 
continuing jurisdiction outside of these periods during particular appeals. There is 
no true separation of powers in the WTO. The DSB (a political body) governs the 
dispute settlement system: it decides to establish panels, adopt panel and Appellate 
Body reports (which have no legal status until they are ‘blessed’ by the DSB) and 
authorize suspension of concessions”.90 In other words, “[i]t is the DSB that makes 
decisions, and the role of the Appellate Body is to advise the DSB on what to do”.91 
Thus, “their status is clearly subsidiary to that of the Dispute Settlement Body”.92 
Such approach could not be further from the individualist approach in the Common 
Law system.  
2. In the DSU, reference to the panel or Appellate Body decision in a given case always 
refer to “the report”, implying that it is the decision by the panel or Appellate Body 
as a whole rather than the sum of individual opinions. The Working Procedure of the 
Appellate Body made this explicit, by stating that the Appellate Body shall “make 
every effort to take their decisions by consensus”93 as the appellate process is a 
collegial process that is designed to “ensure consistency and coherence in decision-
making, and to draw on the individual and collective expertise of the Members”.94 
One may argue that this is not the case, as Art. 17.1 of the DSU states that only three 
out of seven Appellate Body members shall “serve on any one case” as a Division. 
However, one should not mistake this to mean that the other four Members play no 
                         
88 See e.g., Art. 11 of the DSU, which states that “[t]he function of panels is to assist the DSB in discharging its 
responsibilities under this Understanding and the covered agreements.” 
89 WTO Agreement, Art. IV. 2 & 3.  
90 Steger, supra note 5, at 448.  
91 M. Matsushita, ‘Reflections on the Functioning of the Appellate Body’, in G. Marceau (ed), supra note 2, at 548.  
92 L. Bartels, ‘The Separation of Powers in the WTO: How to Avoid Judicial Activism’, 53 International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly (2004) 4, at 864.  
93 WTO Appellate Body, Working Procedures for Appellate Review, WT/AB/WP/6, 16 August 2010, Rule 3(2).  
94 Ibid., at Rule 4(1).  
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role as there is the practice of “Exchange of Views”,95 whereby “the division 
responsible for deciding each appeal shall exchange views with the other Members 
before the division finalizes the appellate report for circulation to the WTO 
Members”.96 To ensure even members who are not part of a Division would make 
meaningful contributions, the Working Procedures also explicitly state that “each 
Member shall receive all documents filed in an appeal”. As explained by former 
Appellate Body Secretariat Director Valerie Hughes and former Appellate Body 
Chairman Claus-Dieter Ehlerman, such exchange of views is not merely 
rubberstamping the decision of the Division but has been “of enormous benefit to the 
work of the Appellate Body” by allowing Divisions “to draw on the individual and 
collective expertise of all members”.97 This is confirmed by the first Appellate Body 
Secretariat Director Debra Steger, who noted that “[i]n one particular early appeal, 
the exchange of views took five days, including two days during which the Appellate 
Body members listened with tremendous respect to a member who was not part of 
the division for that particular case as he tried several different ways to convince the 
division of his point of view”.98 
3. Under the DSU, there is no explicit prohibition of dissenting or individual opinions 
like in the European Court of Justice.99 The only implicit reference to dissent can be 
found in Rule 3(2) of the Working Procedure, which states that the Appellate Body 
shall “make every effort to take their decisions by consensus”100. While there have 
been calls to allow dissenting opinions by some scholars,101 they remain extremely 
rare in both Panel and Appellate Body reports.102 In practice, as the DSB always 
adopts the panel or Appellate Body report as a whole, the Common Law approach of 
allowing individual and sometimes conflicting opinions could create difficulties for 
                         
95 Hughes, supra note 1, at 127-128. 
96 Working Procedures, supra note 93, at Rule 4(3). 
97 Hughes, supra note 1, at 127-128; C.D. Ehlermann, ‘Six Years on the Bench of the “World Trade Court” Some 
Personal Experiences as Member of the Appellate Body of the World Trade Organization’, 36 Journal of World 
Trade (2002) 4, at 612-613.   
98 Steger, supra note 5, at 453.  
99 Terris et al (eds), supra note 82, at, 123.  
100 Working Procedures, supra note 93, Rule 3(2).  
101 Matsushita, supra note 91, at 556-557. See also M. K. Lewis, ‘The Lack of Dissent in WTO Dispute Settlement’, 
9 Journal of International Economic Law (2006) 4, at 895–931.  
102 This does not mean that there are no disagreements among Appellate Body members, but the Appellate Body 
worked very hard to reach consensus. See e.g., Lacarte-Muró, supra note 2, at 478-479. 
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WTO Members. If a report with dissent is adopted, does it mean that the dissenting 
opinion is accepted by the WTO Membership as well? Thus, it seems safer to follow 
the Civil Law tradition of not allowing dissents, or at least not encouraging them. 
Steger provided some hint into the origin of the Appellate Body’s aversion of dissent 
when she noted that one of the reasons for the lack of dissents is because “some of 
[the Appellate Body members] emphasises that in their legal systems dissents were 
not common”. Apparently, these members must be from Civil Law countries.  
4. The fourth hint for the Civil Law influence can be found under Arts. 14.3 and 17.11, 
which mandates that opinions expressed in the panel or Appellate Body report by 
individual panellists or Appellate Body members “shall be anonymous”. Instead, the 
reports are issued by the “faceless foreign judges”103 and nobody is supposed to 
know who authored particular parts of the decision. This again is a hallmark feature 
of the Civil Law system.  
 
B. WTO Follows Stare decisis  
 
As I have demonstrated above, the view that the WTO follows the Common Law model 
is a fallacy. However, is it possible that the WTO, while not adopting the Common Law system 
on a wholesale basis, still follows the rule of stare decisis or binding precedents? Again, the 
answer has to be no. 
 
At the outset, we should recall, as John Jackson has pointed out, “the international legal 
system does not embrace the common law jurisprudence … which calls for courts to operate 
under a stricter ‘precedent’ or ‘stare decisis’ rule”.104 Thus, it is no surprise that most 
international tribunals do not follow the rule of stare decisis.105 Some courts explicitly reject the 
                         
103 J. Bacchus, ‘Table Talk: Around the Table of the Appellate Body of the World Trade Organization’, 35 
Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law (2002) 4, at 1021-1040. 
104 J. Jackson, ‘Designing and Implementing Effective Dispute Settlement Procedures: WTO Dispute Settlement, 
Appraisal and Prospects’, in A. Krueger (ed), The WTO as an International Organization (1998), at 178.  
105 For example, in his comprehensive review on the treatment of precedents by international adjudicators, former 
ICJ President Gilbert Guillaume notes that, while international courts “construct an entire jurisprudence based on 
their own precedent”, they all “distance themselves in principle from the rule of stare decisis”. Similarly, while 
“[t]he arbitration tribunals are … inclined to rely on precedent … with rather excessive zeal”, “stare decisis rule is 
no more applied in ICSID than it is in other international jurisdictional instances.” See G. Guillaume, ‘The Use of 
Precedent by International Judges and Arbitrators’, 2 Journal of International Dispute Settlement, (2011) 1, at 7-16. 
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idea. For example, the Statute of the International Court of Justice made it very clear that “[t]he 
decision of the Court has no binding force except between the parties and in respect of that 
particular case.”106 While other tribunals do not have such explicit language in their constituting 
documents, they usually do not recognize the binding authority of previous decisions.107 There 
has been some suggestions that the International Criminal Court is different in this regard, as Art. 
21.2 of the Rome Statute states that “[t]he court may apply principles and rules of law as 
interpreted in its previous decisions.”108 In my view, however, this is far from acceptance of the 
doctrine of stare decisis, as it merely uses the permissive language “may”, which still falls far 
short of granting binding force to precedents.  
 
Similarly, the concept of precedent is also far from uncontroversial in the multilateral 
trading system. During the GATT era, the Contracting Parties took differing views on the issue. 
The European Economic Community (“EEC”), for example, argued that Panel findings shall be 
“limited to the specific measures under examination” and should not have precedential effect.109 
The US, on the other hand, argued that “when the Council adopted a report, those interpretations 
became GATT law”.110 Moreover, even GATT panels themselves have not recognized the 
precedential effect of previous panel reports. For example, in the 1989 case of EEC - Restrictions 
on Imports of Dessert Apples - Complaint by Chile, the Panel refused to follow the 1980 Panel 
report on EEC - Restrictions on Imports of Apples from Chile111, even though it involves “the 
same product and the same parties as the present matter and a similar set of GATT issues”.112  
   
                                                                               
See also J. Pauwelyn, ‘Minority rules: Precedent and participation before the WTO Appellate Body’, in J. 
Jemielniak, L. Nielsen, & H. Olsen (eds), Establishing Judicial Authority in International Economic Law (2016), at 
footnote 1, which notes that “[t]he only international tribunal to date that was set up with a binding rule of precedent 
(stare decisis) is the Caribbean Court of Justice”.  
106 Statute of the International Court of Justice, Art. 59, available at http://www.icj-cij.org/en/statute (last visited 21 
October 2017).  
107 Sacerdoti, supra note 74, at 7-10.  
108 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, available at https://www.icc-cpi.int/nr/rdonlyres/ea9aeff7-
5752-4f84-be94-0a655eb30e16/0/rome_statute_english.pdf (last visited 21 October 2017).  
109 A. T. L. Chua, ‘Precedent and Principles of WTO Panel Jurisprudence’, 16 Berkeley Journal of International 
Law (1998), at 177.  
110 Ibid.  
111 GATT Panel Report, EEC Restrictions on Imports of Apples from Chile, L/5047, adopted 10 November 1980, 
BISD 27S/98.  
112 GATT Panel Report, European Economic Community – Restrictions on Imports of Apples – Complaint by the 
United States, L/6513, adopted 22 June 1989, BISD 36S/135,  at para. 12.1. See also Chua, supra note 108, at 178.  
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When the WTO came into being, the Ministerial Conference and the General Council 
was bestowed exclusive authority to adopt interpretations of the covered agreements.113 With 
such explicit grant of the interpretive power, it is not unreasonable to infer that such authorities 
cannot be exercised by other institutions.114 This in turn means that, in principle, the legal 
interpretations adopted by the Panel and Appellate Body do not have precedential power. 
Notwithstanding this, many commentators have argued that stare decisis does exist115 and WTO 
Appellate Body reports do have “precedential value”.116 In the paragraphs that follows, I will 
investigate the validity of this claim with a detailed survey of the key WTO cases.  
 
The first WTO case to address the precedential effect of panel reports is the 1996 case 
Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II. In its report, the Panel stated that “panel reports adopted by the 
GATT CONTRACTING PARTIES and the WTO Dispute Settlement Body constitute 
subsequent practice in a specific case by virtue of the decision to adopt them. Article 1(b)(iv) of 
GATT 1994 provides institutional recognition that adopted panel reports constitute subsequent 
practice. Such reports are an integral part of GATT 1994, since they constitute ‘other decisions 
of the CONTRACTING PARTIES to GATT 1947”.117 This view was rejected by the Appellate 
Body, which noted that, first, under GATT 1947, adopted panel reports only bound “the parties 
to the dispute in that particular case”, but not subsequent panels; second, only “the conclusions 
and recommendations in an adopted panel report” are binding, but not the “legal reasonings” in 
the report.118 Citing the grant of exclusive authority to adopt interpretations by the Ministerial 
Conference and General Council under Article IX:2 of the WTO Agreement, the Appellate Body 
also held that Panel reports would not “constitute a definitive interpretation of the relevant 
provisions of [covered agreements]”.119 At the same time, the Appellate Body also noted that 
“[a]dopted panel reports are an important part of the GATT acquis… often considered by 
                         
113 WTO Agreement, Art. IX.2.  
114 Chua, supra note 109, at 174.  
115 See e.g., R. Bhala, ‘Myth about Stare decisis and International Trade Law (Part One of a Trilogy)”, 14 American 
University International Law Review (1998), at 845; K. J Pelc, ‘The welfare implications of Precedent in 
International Law’, in Jemielniak et al (eds.), supra note 105, at 177.  
116 Chua, supra note 109, at 195.  
117 Panel Report, Japan – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, WT/DS8/R, WT/DS10/R, WT/DS11/R, adopted 1 
November 1996, as modified by Appellate Body Report WT/DS8/AB/R, WT/DS10/AB/R, WT/DS11/AB/R, DSR 
1996:I, p. 125, para. 6.10. 
118 Appellate Body Report, Japan – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, WT/DS8/AB/R, WT/DS10/AB/R, 
WT/DS11/AB/R, adopted 1 November 1996, DSR 1996:I, p. 97, at 13.  
119 Ibid.  
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subsequent panels”, which “create legitimate expectations among WTO Members, and, therefore, 
should be taken into account where they are relevant to any dispute”.120 Even unadopted panel 
reports could provide “useful guidance” to future panels.121 However, to prevent any illusion on 
the binding effect of panel reports, the Appellate Body also made it explicit that “they are not 
binding, except with respect to resolving the particular dispute between the parties to that 
dispute”.122  
 
In a way, it is not surprising that the Appellate Body took a cautious approach on the 
presidential value of panel reports in this case. The Appellate Body was barely one year old 
when the case was decided, thus it is better to avoid controversial statements so as not to 
undermine its own legitimacy as a new institution. Moreover, the Appellate Body did not address 
the precedential effects of its own reports, a question that is only answered in the subsequent 
case of US - Shrimp (Article 21.5 Malaysia). In that case, the Appellate Body expanded its 
approach in Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II in two very important ways. First, the Appellate 
Body confirmed that Appellate Body reports, just like panel reports, “provided interpretative 
guidance” for panels.123 This is not very surprising, because it is only natural that the Appellate 
Body, as the institution reviewing panel decisions, would have at least the same power as the 
panel. Second, in addition to confirming that “[t]he Panel was correct in using [the Appellate 
Body’s] findings as a tool for its own reasoning”,124 the Appellate Body went one step further by 
stating that the Panel “was right to use” and “rely on” the “reasoning” of the Appellate Body 
report in US - Shrimp.125 This is one big step towards recognizing the precedential effect of 
Appellate Body reports, as the key in a precedent is its ratio decidendi or reasoning. Furthermore, 
to dispel any speculation that the reasoning in the Appellate Body report in US - Shrimp applied 
to the current case only because the two cases concern the same dispute on the same measure 
                         
120 Ibid., at 14.  
121 Ibid., at 15.  
122 Ibid., at 14.  
123 Appellate Body Report, United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products – Recourse 
to Article 21.5 of the DSU by Malaysia, WT/DS58/AB/RW, adopted 21 November 2001, DSR 2001:XIII, p. 6481, 
at para. 107.  
124 Ibid., at para. 109.  
125 Ibid., at para. 107. The report referred to here is Appellate Body Report, United States – Import Prohibition of 
Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, WT/DS58/AB/R, adopted 6 November 1998, DSR 1998:VII, p. 2755.  
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between the same parties, the Appellate Body also made clear that such reasoning shall be relied 
on by not only “the Panel in this case”, but also all “future panels”.126  
 
Some “future panels”, however, chose to ignore the Appellate Body’s edict, resulting in a 
tug of war between the panel and the Appellate Body. The most contentious battle is fought over 
the legality of “zeroing” practices by the US, where some WTO panels persistently refused to 
follow settled Appellate Body jurisprudence on the issue. In the US - Stainless Steel (Mexico) 
case, for example, the Panel refused to follow previous Appellate Body decisions even though it 
was aware that its reasoning is very similar to those of the two Panel decisions that have been 
overruled by the Appellate Body.127 According to the Panel, such an approach is mandated by 
Article 11 of the DSU, which requires panels to carry out an objective examination of the matter 
at issue.128 The EU, one of the third parties in the case, became so frustrated that it asked the 
Appellate Body “to unambiguously re-confirm that all panels are expected and therefore also 
obliged, to follow its rulings on these issues” (emphasis original).129 Their frustration is shared 
by the Appellate Body, which stated that they “are deeply concerned about the Panel's decision 
to depart from well-established Appellate Body jurisprudence clarifying the interpretation of the 
same legal issues”.130 Citing the need to ensure “security and predictability" in the dispute 
settlement system in Article 3.2 of the DSU, the Appellate Body held that “[w]hile the 
application of a provision may be regarded as confined to the context in which it takes place, the 
relevance of clarification contained in adopted Appellate Body reports is not limited to the 
application of a particular provision in a specific case.”131 Thus, the Appellate Body concluded, 
“absent cogent reasons, an adjudicatory body will resolve the same legal question in the same 
way in a subsequent case.”132  
 
                         
126 Ibid. 
127 Panel Report, United States – Final Anti-Dumping Measures on Stainless Steel from Mexico, WT/DS344/R, 
adopted 20 May 2008, as modified by Appellate Body Report WT/DS344/AB/R, DSR 2008:II, p. 599, at para. 7.106.  
128 Ibid. 
129 In the World Trade Organisation before the Appellate Body AB-2008-1, DS344 United States – Final Anti-
Dumping Measures on Stainless Steel from Mexico, Third participant notification and written submission by the 
European Communities, 25 February 2008 Geneva, at para. 56.  
130 Appellate Body Report, United States – Final Anti-Dumping Measures on Stainless Steel from Mexico, 
WT/DS344/AB/R, adopted 20 May 2008, DSR 2008:II, p. 513, at para. 162.  
131 Ibid., at para. 161.  
132 Ibid., at para. 160.  
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Does this statement mean that Appellate Body reports now shall be treated as binding 
precedents? While WTO Members differ widely on this issue,133 the strong wordings of the 
Appellate Body certainly provided plenty of ammunition for the claim that the WTO now has a 
system of binding precedents, or stare decisis.134 However, I think that such exuberance about 
the existence of a precedent system in the WTO dispute settlement system is not only irrational 
but also premature, as the Appellate Body itself explicitly stated, at the beginning of its 
discussion on the issue, that “[i]t is well settled that Appellate Body reports are not binding, 
except with respect to resolving the particular dispute between the parties.”135 Compared to the 
highly cautionary language used earlier, the Appellate Body has made it very clear, in a 
straightforward and unequivocal manner, that there is no formal or de jure system of precedents 
in WTO dispute settlement.136  
 
Therefore, at most, one can only claim the existence of a de facto precedent system in the 
WTO, but “it is certainly not stare decisis”,137 as pointed out by John Jackson, who argued that  
“[the] precedent effect in the jurisprudence of the WTO …is not so powerful as to require 
panels or the Appellate Body considering new cases to follow prior cases, with the 
possible exception that one prior case have been numerous regarding a particular issue 
and approach, and apparently accepted by all members of the WTO, then the language of 
the Vienna Convention Appellate Body out ‘practice under the agreement,’ may suggest a 
stronger impact. But short of that situation, it appears that the ‘flavor’ of the precedent 
effect in the WTO is still somewhat fluid, and possibly will remain somewhat fluid for the 
time being.” 
                         
133 See e.g., David’s discussion on the heated debate between WTOP Members when the Appellate Body Report in 
US - Stainless Steel was adopted. F. David, ‘The Role of Precedent in the WTO - New Horizons?’, Maastricht 
Faculty of Law Working Paper No. 2009-12 (2009). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1666169, at 8-9.  
134 See Sacerdoti, supra note 74, at 14; C. Davis, ‘Deterring Disputes: WTO Dispute Settlement as a Tool for 
Conflict Management’, Prepared for presentation to the Annual Meeting of the International Political Economy 
Society (2016), at 20; S. Cho, ‘Precedent as a Social Phenomenon: System, Language and Symbol’, Chicago-Kent 
Research Paper Series, June 1, 2016, available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2791744, at 20-21; R. Alford, 
‘The Role of Precedent at the WTO’, Opinion Juris, 2 May 2008, available at http://opiniojuris.org/2008/05/02/the-
role-of-precedent-at-the-wto/.  
135 Appellate Body Report, supra note 130, at para. 158.  
136 This view is shared by many Appellate Body insiders. For example, Unterhalter stated that “[t]he WTO dispute 
settlement system knows no formal system of precedent” in Unterhalter, supra note 9, at 473. Matsushita stated that 
“in the WTO jurisprudence stare decisis is not recognized” in Matsushita, supra note 91, at 552. Hughes stated that 
“stare decisis does not apply in the WTO dispute settlement system” in V. Hughes, ‘Working in WTO Dispute 
Settlement: Pride without Prejudice’, in G. Marceau (ed.), supra note 2, at 421.  
137 J. H. Jackson, Sovereignty, the WTO, and Changing Fundamentals of International Law (2006), at 177.  
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To paraphrase Jackson, much of the confusion regarding the precedential effect of the 
panel and Appellate Body reports arose because the word “precedent” is a “complex concept” 
with “many flavors”.138 To avoid this, Jackson proposed to view the word as “a multi-layered 
concept, or at least as having a number of different approaches of different flavors”. However, as 
we can see from the foregoing discussion, such an approach could still lead to confusions. 
Instead, I would suggest ceasing to refer to the previous decisions of the Appellate Body as 
precedents, but to call them as “jurisprudence” instead.  
 
Moreover, as Beshkar and Chilton have argued, conferring binding force on Appellate 
Body reports could raise substantive systematic costs.139 For example, WTO Members might 
rush to bring cases, or at least participate as third parties, in a bid to shape the jurisprudence 
through litigation.140 Wrong judicial precedents might perpetuate over time as the consensus 
requirement makes it difficult for the legislative branch to correct them.141 All these will be 
unfair for the small and poorer countries as they are less likely to participate in WTO disputes.142   
 
In addition to these practical reasons, I would add another very important constitutional 
reason. The Appellate Body was set up as a “safety valve”143 to check against “rogue” panels144 
which might render “bad reports”.145 It was never meant to be a judicial branch that is on par 
with the legislative branch to safeguard the so-called separation of powers as under some 
domestic legal systems. Elevating Appellate Body reports to the status of binding precedents 
could seriously undermine the nature of the WTO as a “Member-driven” organization.146  
 
                         
138 Ibid., at  173.  
139 M. Beshkar & A. Chilton, ‘Revisiting Procedure and Precedent in the WTO: An Analysis of US – Countervailing 
and Anti-Dumping Measures (China)’, 15 World Trade Review (2016) 2, at 386-388.  
140 Ibid., at 386-387. 
141 Ibid., at 387-388. 
142 Ibid., at 387.  
143 R. E. Hudec, Dispute Settlement, in J. Schott (ed.), Completing the Uruguay Round: A Results-oriented 
Approach to the GATT Trade Negotiations (1990), at 191. 
144 Hughes, supra note 1, at 121-122. 
145 Steger, supra note 5, at 447. See also P. V. D. Bossche, From Afterthought to Centrepiece, The WTO Appellate 
Body and Its Rise to Prominence in the World Trading System, in G. Sacerdoti, A. Yanovich and J. Bohannes (eds.),  
The WTO at Ten: The Contribution of the Dispute Settlement System (2006), at 292-294.  
146 For discussions on WTO as a “Member-driven” organization, see M. Elsig, 'The World Trade Organization at 
Work: Performance in a Member-driven Milieu', 5 Review of International Organizations (2016) 3, 345–363. 
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C. WTO Has Rules Against Dicta  
 
Even if the WTO does not have a system of precedent, could it still have rules against 
dicta? This is more than pure academic speculation, as many WTO Members, especially the US, 
has repeatedly referred to certain parts of panel reports as “dicta” in their written submissions. 
This point, however, is highly contestable as what a WTO Member might view as "obiter 
dictum" may often be a necessary link in the panel’s overall analysis leading to the final findings. 
For example, in a case involving the non-discrimination obligations, the panel would have to first 
determine if the two products are alike before deciding whether the measure at issue is indeed 
discriminatory. If the panel makes a negative finding on likeness, this does not mean that the 
panel should stop its analysis there, because such a finding might be overturned on appeal. Thus, 
a more prudent course of action for the panel would be to continue making findings on the 
discrimination issue, lest the Appellate Body do not have sufficient facts to “complete the 
analysis” when the likeness finding is reversed.147  
 
Compared to the allegations from WTO Members, what is even more worrying is the 
usage of the concept of “dicta” by the Appellate Body itself in its own reports. What does the 
Appellate Body mean by “dicta” then? Again this can only be found out from the Appellate 
Body’s own words. 
 
The very first case where the Appellate Body mentioned dicta is the Canada – 
Periodicals case, in which the Appellate Body held that, the statement by the panel in EEC - 
Oilseeds148 that "it can reasonably be assumed that a payment not made directly to producers is 
not made ‘exclusively’ to them" is “obiter dicta” because the panel already found that subsidies 
paid to oilseeds processors were not made "exclusively to domestic producers".149 However, the 
Appellate Body does not explain further why such statement is considered dicta. We can only 
surmise that the statement is regarded as dicta because it is about a moot issue.  
                         
147 For an analysis on the issue, see A. Yanovich & T. Voon, 'Completing the Analysis in WTO Appeals: The 
Practice and its Limitations', Journal of International Economic Law 9 (2006), 933–950. 
148 GATT Panel Report, European Economic Community – Payments and Subsidies Paid to Processors and 
Producers of Oilseeds and Related Animal Feed Proteins, L/6627, adopted 25 January 1990, BISD 37S/86.  
149 Appellate Body Report, Canada – Certain Measures Concerning Periodicals, WT/DS31/AB/R, adopted 30 July 
1997, DSR 1997:I, p. 449, at 33.   
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In the US - Shrimp (Article 21.5 – Malaysia) case, the Appellate Body told us what is not 
dicta by stating that “[t]he reasoning in our Report in United States – Shrimp on which the Panel 
relied was not dicta; it was essential to our ruling”.150 This suggests that dicta is something that is 
not essential to the ruling of the Appellate Body.  
 
In the US-Gambling case, the Appellate Body visited the issue again, when the parties 
debated whether the Panel’s statement on whether “practice” as such may be challenged as a 
“measure”.151 The Appellate Body ruled that, as Antigua, the Complaint, was not challenging a 
practice as such, the Panel’s statement did not constitute a “‘finding’ of the Panel”. Thus, the 
Appellate Body concluded, “the Panel's statement on ‘practice’, in our view, was a mere obiter 
dictum, and we need not rule on it.”152 Ironically, however, the Appellate Body followed this 
statement with yet another dictum on dicta, by stating that, 
“We nevertheless express our disagreement with the Panel's understanding of previous 
Appellate Body decisions. The Appellate Body has not, to date, pronounced upon the issue of 
whether "practice" may be challenged, as such, as a "measure" in WTO dispute settlement.”153  
 
From these three cases, we can see that the Appellate Body’s main criteria for 
distinguishing dicta from holding is whether the statement at issue is relevant or essential to the 
decision. However, like with any other legal issue, the Appellate Body’s position here must be 
supported by provisions in the covered agreements. Unfortunately, the covered agreements do 
not include any explicit prohibition of dicta. Instead, the claim that dicta are not allowed can 
only be inferred from WTO provisions, as the US alleged in their statement at the DSB meeting 
on 23 May 2017. According to the US, “more than two-thirds of the Appellate Body’s analysis 
[in Argentina — Measures Relating to Trade in Goods and Services] – 46 pages – is in the nature 
of obiter dicta” because: 
                         
150 Appellate Body Report, supra note 123, at para. 107.  
151 Appellate Body Report, United States – Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting 
Services, WT/DS285/AB/R, adopted 20 April 2005, DSR 2005:XII, p. 5663 (and Corr.1, DSR 2006:XII, p. 5475), at 
paras. 129-130.  
152 Ibid., at para. 131.  
153 Ibid., at para. 132. 
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“The Appellate Body reversed the panel’s findings on likeness and said that this reversal 
rendered moot all the panel’s findings on all other issues, including treatment no less 
favorable, an affirmative defense, and the prudential exception under the GATS. Yet, the 
Appellate Body report then went on at great length to set out interpretations of various 
provisions of the GATS. These interpretations served no purpose in resolving the dispute 
– they were appeals of moot panel findings. Thus, more than two-thirds of the Appellate 
Body’s analysis is comprised simply of advisory opinions on legal issues.”154 
 
As mentioned earlier, such a position is premised on the Common Law view that the law-
making power of the court arises from its function to solve disputes, thus the rulings which are 
necessary to resolve the disputes become the holdings, while those which are unnecessary 
become dicta. Therefore, the hidden assumption of such argument is that the roles of the Panel 
and Appellate Body are limited to resolving trade disputes. A closer reading of the DSU reveals, 
however, not only there is no support for such a view in the text of the DSU, but also the DSU 
explicitly requires the panel and Appellate Body to go beyond merely solving disputes.  
 
First, according to Art. 3.2 of the DSU, the WTO dispute settlement system serves not 
only to “preserve the rights and obligations of Members under the covered agreements”, but also 
to “clarify the existing provisions of those agreements in accordance with customary rules of 
interpretation of public international law”. As explained by Art. 3.4, the first function is achieved 
through “prompt settlement” of disputes. But this apparently does not apply to the second 
function, as clarifications of treaty provisions often have to be conducted beyond the narrow 
confines of individual disputes. Indeed, it could be argued that the use of the term “clarify” here 
widens the general roles of panels and Appellate Body and enables them to provide “guidance” 
to the Members’ future conducts under the covered agreements.155  
 
Second, the panel is under an explicit obligation to “address the relevant provisions in 
any covered agreement or agreements cited by the parties to the dispute”.156 This means that, 
                         
154 Mission of the United States, supra note 12, at 13.  
155 G. Sacerdoti, The Dispute Settlement System of the WTO in Action: A Perspective on the First Ten Years, in G. 
Sacerdoti, A. Yanovich and J. Bohannes (eds.), supra note 145, at 49.   
156 DSU, Art. 7.2.  
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even if a provision cited by a party turns out to be inapplicable because the issue is moot, the 
panel still has to address it. Otherwise, the panel could well be accused of failing to fulfil its 
obligation under Arts. 7.2 and 11, especially if the Appellate Body decides to overturn the 
panel’s finding that the specific provision is inapplicable.  
 
Third, Art. 17.12 imposes similar obligation on the Appellate Body with even more 
explicit language by requiring the Appellate Body to “address each of the issues raised in 
accordance with paragraph 6 during the appellate proceeding.” Again, failure to comply with the 
obligation could expose the Appellate Body to allegations of violations of its duties under the 
DSU.    
 
Fourth, more importantly, even for issues or provisions not raised by the parties, neither 
Art. 7 nor Art. 17 prohibits the panel or the Appellate Body from considering or ruling on such 
issues. To the contrary, as every lawyer knows, they often need to consider the unnamed 
provisions in order to assess the contexts of the provisions at issue in the litigation. One might 
argue that such a restriction can be found under Art. 17.6, which states that “[a]n appeal shall be 
limited to issues of law covered in the panel report and legal interpretations developed by the 
panel.” However, this provision at best only delineates what may be appealed by the parties to 
the dispute, but it does not impose restrictions on what the Appellate Body may rule upon. Even 
though Art. 17.12 refers to Art. 17.6, one cannot conclude that the Appellate Body is thus subject 
to the same restriction as it only states that “[t]he Appellate Body shall address each of the issues 
raised in accordance with [Art. 17.6]”. To the contrary, had the Members intended to also limit 
the power of the AB, they would have used the same language as Art. 17.6 here by stating that 
“the rulings of the Appellate Body shall be limited to issues raised in accordance with paragraph 
6 during the appellate proceeding.”  
 
To sum up, as the discussions above have illustrated, the covered agreements do not 
really distinguish between holdings or dicta in a decision. Thus, if anything, the Appellate 
Body’s announcement on so-called “dicta” in panel and Appellate Body reports is nothing but 
dictum on dicta. This approach is dangerous not only because it lacks legal basis in the covered 
agreements, but also because it could backfire when Members in turn borrow the term and 
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accuse the Appellate Body itself of rolling out dicta, which is exactly what the US has done in 
the reappointment saga.  
 
4. Conclusion 
 
As Hersch Lauterpacht has wisely warned 60 years ago, "[i]t is not conducive to clarity to 
apply to the work of the Court the supposedly rigid delimitation between obiter dicta and ratio 
decidendi applicable to a legal system based on the strict doctrine of precedent.”157 The reason 
for this, as explained by former International Court of Justice President Jennings, is that when 
international lawyers talk about an obiter dictum, they imply “the existence in international law 
decisions of something that the common lawyer calls the ratio decidendi.”158 Similarly, 
“whenever judges or publicists talk about obiter dicta the point of the distinction from the ratio 
decidendi is conceded by implication.”159  
 
However, as I have argued in this article, the Appellate Body has consistently rejected the 
idea that there is a system of binding precedents or stare decisis in the WTO. To be consistent, 
the Appellate Body should then stop using such loaded words like ratio and dicta, both of which 
are unique to the Common Law system of binding precedents. If the Appellate Body agrees with 
the previous rulings of the panel or itself, they shall just refer to it as “persuasive jurisprudence”, 
or “jurisprudence constante” if they prefer to use a more established term. If they do not like the 
ruling on a particular issue, the Appellate Body should just state that it is wrong, or that it is not 
relevant to the issues raised in the case, not necessary for the resolution of the dispute at hand, or 
concerns a moot issue that is not argued by the parties, rather than bury it under the ambiguous 
and unhelpful tombstone of “obiter dicta”.   
 
This is not just a petty issue of mere semantics, because words could influence people’s 
thinking. As shown by my previous discussions, with such injudicious usage of terms, the 
                         
157 H. Lauterpacht, The Development of International Law by the International Court (2nd ed, 1958), at 61. 
158 R. Y. Jennings, ‘The Judiciary, International and National, and the Development of International Law’, 45 
International & Comparative Law Quarterly (1996) 1 at 10.  
159 Ibid., at 12.  
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Appellate Body has brought the destiny upon itself when Members started to fling accusations of 
dicta towards the Appellate Body’s own reports.     
 
Does this mean that the WTO Members have no way of controlling unwanted or 
unpopular emanations from the AB? The answer is no. Instead, I think the WTO Members could 
make use of any or all of the following suggestions: 
   
First, the DSB could choose to adopt only the findings and recommendations of the panel 
and Appellate Body. As stated in Arts. 11 and 19.2 of the DSU, what really matters in the panel 
and Appellate Body reports are their “findings and recommendations”. This is confirmed by Art. 
21 and 22, which states that the losing party only need to comply with “recommendations or 
rulings of the DSB.” The findings are simply the legal conclusions without the detailed reasoning. 
As the reasoning is not adopted, there is no need to debate whether it falls under ratio or dicta. 
However, amendment of the DSU might be needed as one could argue that, under Arts. 16.4 and 
17.14, the entire panel or Appellate Body report shall be adopted.  
 
Second, if the Appellate Body’s interpretation on a particular provision is so universally 
endorsed by the Members that the Members really want it to become part of WTO law, it shall 
be adopted only with a three-fourths majority of the Members. This is how an authoritative 
interpretation by the General Council or Ministerial Conference may be adopted, and it should 
also be how the interpretations of the Appellate Body are accorded authoritative status. It would 
create perverse incentives if such interpretation could be sneaked in through back-door via the 
operation of the negative consensus rule for the adoption of Appellate Body reports while a 
proper authoritative interpretation has to go through the painful process of garnering the requisite 
majority among all WTO Members.  
 
Third, on the other hand, if the Members are so appalled by what they perceive to be a 
blatantly wrongful interpretation by the Appellate Body in its report, they could always prevent 
further contamination of the WTO jurisprudence by trying to adopt an authoritative interpretation 
of the relevant provision and explicitly reject the approach taken by the AB, just like a 
parliament would do in a Common Law jurisdiction. Of course, as at least one disputing party 
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always stands to benefit from the interpretation at issue, it might be difficult to reach the 
consensus required to adopt the authoritative interpretation, unless such benefiting Member is 
also willing to join the consensus for systemic reasons.  
 
In view of the current paralysis of the decision-making mechanism of the WTO, it might 
take some time before such suggestions may be accepted in practice. In the meantime, the 
Appellate Body should at least rid its reports off words such as “dicta”, lest the self-fulfilling 
prophecy ultimately becomes the Appellate Body’s own destiny.  
 
  
